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A Realist Conception of Truth has been generally praised as a serious and insightful work on epistemology. This 
William P. Alston’s text is directed at those who are concerned with epistemological studies, those interested in 
how to contemplate on truth, and those epistemologists seeking for justification of beliefs, statements, sentences 
and propositions. In this text, the problem of truth receives a critical exploration in Alston’s polemic of realism. 
Alston’s goal is to defend a version of realism. Ultimately, he argues that the most defensible version of realist 
theories is alethic realism, which suggests simply that, “A statement is true if and only if what the statement is 
about is as the statement says it is. Alternatively in terms of propositions, the conception is such that the schema 
‘it is true that p if and only if p yields a (necessary, conceptually, analytically) true statement for any substitution 
instance” (Alston, 1997: 1). As a matter of fact, the author’s view is a cross reference to the issue of truth 
discussed from the days of Socrates to Edmund Gettier; then to our time.  
 
From Ancient to Contemporary epoch, philosophers are continually raising questions concerning the nature of 
truth and how it can be cogitated. While it is a truism that there is no monolithic idea on how truth can be 
derived, there is nonetheless a consensus that truth is invaluable. Alston’s book argues that the traditional 
epistemic accounts of truth (correspondence, pragmatic and coherence theories) are misguided approaches to 
truth. What is truth? And, how is truth to be discovered? These questions though appear simple, have generated 
controversies in different philosophical quarters. Thus, Alston thinks that it is appropriate that one considers 
them anew. Questions that should be pounding on a critic’s mind include: What does this book seek to explain? 
What is truth to Alston? How is Alston’s theory of truth different from other theories of truth? Is Alston 
affirming or denying the idea of truth? In short, what is the book all about?  
 
According to Alston, the discourse on truth is a crucial aspect of knowledge. However, he thinks that privilege 
theories on truth that we have today have not adequately (or perhaps, have not correctly) explored the nature and 
meaning of truth. In a sense, Alston is suggesting that traditional accounts of truth, which he calls—epistemic 
conceptions of truth, are theoretically misguided. Examples of epistemic theories of truth that Alston identifies 
include coherence and pragmatic theories of truth. These theories, according to him, consider the issue of truth 
from epistemic angles, wherein notion such as justification, verification, certainty, rationality, knowledge or 
general consensus is considered as the criterion of truth. However, Alston rejects these epistemic notions as 
bases for truth. Alston (1997: 7) notes thus: “As for epistemic accounts, they take the truth of a statement or 
belief to consist of some positive epistemic status of the statement or belief—its being justified (in conditions of 
some idealised sort), or being adequately supported by evidence, or by being ‘warrantably assertable’, or 
cohering with some system of beliefs. Traditional coherence and pragmatist theories of truth fall under this 
rubric, as well as some recent views.”   
 
Apparently, the author maintains that, “In particular, and looking forward to the main alternative to this account 
of truth, there are no epistemic requirements for the truth of any statement” (Alston, 1997: 5). He presents alethic 
realism as an alternative to epistemic theories of truth. Having noted that there is no need for epistemic standards 
for a belief, statement or proposition to be adjudged true, Alston goes on to explore how truth is to be considered. 
Let us sketch what Alston is refuting and what he is affirming in his book before we consider his major 
arguments and conclusions.  
 
A Realist Conception of Truth focuses on refuting the following: (1) deflationary accounts of truth (which deny 
that truth has a property); (2) Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam’s anti-realist epistemic theories (which 
suggest that the mind must add structure and content to the world, leading to the thesis that objectivity of the 
external world is impossible), (3) epistemic accounts of truth (verificationist, relativist, coherentist, and 
pragmatist theories) and epistemic standards for truth-value,  and (4) the use of sentences, beliefs and statements 
as bearers of truth.  
 
What is it that the book is affirming? According to Alston’s theory, there are at least five dimensions of alethic 
realism. Hence, the book is aimed at arguing that: (a) epistemic notions such as verification, rationality and 
certainty are crucial as regards to knowledge and its validation, but these do not form part of the conception of 
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truth. To Alston (1997: 6), “It is by virtue of the meaning of ‘true’ that a statement is true if and only if what the 
statement says is the case actually is the case”, (b) the discussions of epistemic justification should be 
discontinued since many people would be removed from discourse on truth if no corroboration can be made 
concerning their beliefs (rather, he notes that when our beliefs are formed in a ‘reliable way’ and we have 
‘adequate grounds’ for them,  these are enough or desirable for our purpose of cognition than relying on 
justification), (c) truth has a property (that is, Alston believes that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-
value in the sense that it is propositions that one has in mind when one says that a statement, belief or sentence is 
true. In other words, “For what is asserted or what is believed, the content of an assertion or a belief, is a 
proposition” (Alston, 1997: 15), (d) we cannot have justification without truth in the same way that we cannot 
have knowledge without truth (hence truth is the most fundamental property in epistemology), (e) there is a need 
to demarcate the concept of truth from its property. (Alston (1997: 37) notes that, “…the property of truth may 
have various features that are not reflected in our concept of truth”), and (f) the truth maker is to be made known 
by the truth bearer. Thus, Alston posits that, “…the truth maker is something that is objective vis-a-vis the truth 
bearer. It has to do with what the truth bearer is about, rather than with some ‘internal’ or ‘intrinsic’ feature of 
the truth bearer, such as its epistemic status, its place in a system of propositions, or the confidence with which it 
is held” (Alston, 1997: 7-8). In this last stance, Alston seems to argue that truth has to do with a potential truth 
bearer to a reality or state of affair beyond it (this is ‘fact’ that is external to the knower).  
 
As a realist, Alston ventures into a discourse on alethic realism and truth by identifying that there are different 
shades of realism. These include naïve (direct) realism, critical realism, scientific realism, moral realism, among 
others.  Naïve realism holds that our senses provide us with immediate awareness of the external world. This 
position suggests that objects have size, shape, texture, colour and weight, and that we can objectively perceive 
them as they are. That is, objects retain their content (properties) independent of whether we perceive them or 
not. Critical realism posits that properties of objects such as primary sense data (weight, shape, size, etc) are 
inherent in objects, whereas secondary qualities such as odour, colour, etc. are not part of the object (that is, 
secondary sense data do not actually represent any external objects). Scientific realism notes that certain objects 
are real. Alston takes realism to be a better exploration of the state of affair, although he differentiates his stance 
(alethic realism) from the aforementioned realist postures. His realism focuses more on truth, than justifying the 
external world. That the external world and objects exist independent of the knowing mind, to Alston, are not 
something that a reasonable theory will deny since truth deals with the existence of what is asserted. Thus Alston 
(1997: 8) says that, “…if our concept of truth is a realist one, then all our beliefs owe their truth value to the fact 
that they are related in a certain way to a reality beyond themselves.” Later on, Alston shows the affinities 
among different segments of realism, and affirms that it is the distinguishing features of alethic realism that 
“…everything we believe can be assessed for truth value” and that, “… realism is more widely and more 
naturally used for a variety of positions that take something or other to really exist” (Alston, 1997: 8). 
 
One of the book’s strengths is the opportunity it affords us to examine the issue of the bearer of truth-value, 
thereby nullifying the use of sentences and statements as the bearers of truth. Alston argues that the reasons why 
sentences cannot be employed as truth bearers include: (a) a single sentence may have different truth-values or 
diverse meanings, and (b) even a given sentence with one and the same meaning may be used to make different 
statements. For instance, the author opines that when a sentence such as “Harold Stassen is still running” is 
uttered, there is an ambiguity on whether ‘running’ should be interpreted as Stassen is moving or he is contesting 
for an office in an election. Alston (1997: 10) puts this thus, “That sentence can be used to state that Stassen is 
still locomoting by moving his legs rapidly, and also to state that Stassen is still offering himself as a candidate 
for an election. It may well be that at a certain moment; one of these statements is true and the other false.” To 
him, it is essential that a bearer of truth should have only one definite truth value. While he argues that sentence 
cannot be a truth bearer, he nurses the opinion that, “The attribution of truth values to statement-making sentence 
token escapes” (Alston, 1997: 11) all the objections accruable to sentence or sentence type. The author (1997: 11) 
says that, “A sentence type is what is ordinarily called a ‘sentence’, a unit of language that can be uttered, used, 
inscribed on many different occasions. A sentence token can be thought of as one of those utterances or 
inscriptions of the sentence type.” Even at that, he argues that only indicative sentence type or sentence token 
can be used as a bearer of truth. Against this backdrop, performative and evaluative sentences are excluded as 
truth bearers. Alston (1997: 24) avers that, “The basic reason has to do with the fact that we speak of statements 
(assertions) as true or false but that we do not ascribe truth values to requests, promises, appointing, expressions 
of gratitude, hopes, doubts, or wonderings. Nor is this selectivity arbitrary. The reason for it is that in making 
statements and holding beliefs, we commit ourselves to the propositional contents being true.” 
 
Moreover, he rejects the use of beliefs and statements as the bearers of truth-value. Alston believes that when the 
notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ are applicable to the contents of beliefs and statements, then their truth-values can be 
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deduced from beliefs and statements as bearers of truth. But Alston thinks that there is ambiguity also in what 
beliefs and statements connote. He says that statements (assertions) and beliefs (judgments) exhibit what can be 
depicted as act-object ambiguity. He writes that, “An ‘assertion’ can either be an act of asserting or what is 
asserted. A belief can also be a certain psychological state one is in—perhaps a certain neural disposition or 
pattern of activity—or what the statement is ‘directed onto’, what is believed” (Alston, 1997: 14). Since there is 
an uncertainty of meaning of belief/statement as acts or objects (that is, the act of asserting or psychological state 
on the one hand, and the object that is asserted or believed on the other hand), Alston thinks that the notion of 
proposition can better resolve this ambiguity. Alston (1997: 14) reiterates that, “It is clear to me that truth values 
attach primarily to what is believed (asserted), and secondarily, if at all, to the state of belief or the act of 
asserting.” In this respect, therefore, he maintains that it is on the content of a belief that truth is based. “For what 
is asserted or what is believed, the content of an assertion or a belief, is a proposition” (Alston, 1997: 15). 
Apparently, he holds that nothing can be a proposition unless it has a single or determinate truth-value (Alston, 
1997: 17). 
 
He describes propositions as states of affairs that may or may not obtain. In other words, a proposition may be 
used to claim that something is the case. That is, it may be used to argue that a state of affairs is or is not. In this 
case, “A state of affairs that obtains can be called fact” (Alston, 1997: 18). Alston insists that when a state of 
affairs is actually what it was claimed to be, then such a proposition is true, otherwise it is false. To be more 
explicit, Alston gives an example thus: ‘Gold is malleable’. Proposition has both subject and predicate terms. 
Gold is the subject, which claims to have the content or property of malleability. The point that he strikes here is 
that if ‘malleability’ is the property attributed to ‘gold’, the truthfulness of the proposition that ‘Gold is malleable’ 
can be shown by establishing whether the said property is actually in gold or not. This is what is required in the 
establishment of a proposition’s truth-value. The author (1997: 21) then submits that, “My central concern here 
is the articulation and defense of a realist conception of truth, in opposition to epistemic conceptions.” Hence, 
the maxim of truth is captured thus: “A proposition is true if and only if what the maker of a statement with that 
proposition as content is attributing to what the statement is about, in making that statement, does actually what 
the statement is about” (Alston, 1997: 26). This maxim is called the T-schema (where T stands for ‘truth’) 
alluding to Tarski’s view. 
 
Following Tarski’s propositional truth which suggests that ‘X is true if p’ (which Alston calls the T-schema), he 
(Alston) formulates an instance (T-statement) thus: ‘grass is green if and only if grass is green’. The author gets 
an instance of Tarski’s T-schema by replacing p with a declarative sentence, and ‘X’ with an expression 
referring to that sentence. Alston, then, argues that, “The T-schema is not a statement but a statement schema, a 
form of statement. And each instantiation thereof, each T-statement, provides a condition for the truth of a 
particular proposition, not a general statement of what it is for a proposition to be true” (Alston, 1997: 27-28). 
Accordingly, he notes that if “…we understand that any T-statement is conceptually, analytically true, true by 
virtue of the meanings of the terms involved, in particular the term ‘true’, then we thereby understand what it is 
for a proposition to be true” (Alston, 1997: 27) in a realist sense.  
 
The problem with Tarski’s view is that true is formulated using sentence, rather than proposition. Thus, to make 
Tarski’s T-schema wears a universal appeal; the author suggests that this can be done in two ways. Firstly, it is 
important to make the T-sentence not to refer to any entity; hence he says that we can universally generalise the 
T-schema thus: “The proposition that p is true if p” (Alston, 1997: 28). In this case, the universal generalisation 
of the T-schema is true if and only if substitution instances are true. The basic idea of the realist conception of 
truth is to specify when the content (property) of a position is realised (or not) by asserting what would make the 
position the case. While Alston affirms largely that Tarski’s semantic conception of truth though does not face 
the criticisms leveled against sentences as bearers of truth, yet he does not see any good reason why the latter 
held that the material criterion of adequacy is relevant for the definition of truth in the T-schema. 
 
Apparently, Alston presents a minimalist account of truth which, to him, contrasts with correspondence, 
pragmatic, coherence and epistemic theories of truth. While these latter theories (pragmatism, coherentism, etc.) 
are minimalist accounts, his criticisms are directed against correspondence theory in the main. Firstly, the 
connections between realist conception of truth (minimalist theory) and correspondence theory of truth are 
shown. These include the fact that (a) “…a true proposition is made true by a fact” (Alston, 1997: 32) and (b) 
“…there is an identity of content between proposition and fact” (Alston, 1997: 33) However, Alston raises a 
number of criticisms against what he describes as full-dress correspondence theory when he notes that: (a) in the 
T-schema “The proposition that p is true if and only if p” is not a definition of truth, whereas scholars like 
Russell and Wittgenstein who are advocates of correspondence theory seem to define truth, and (b) his 
minimalist account does not claim that the meaning of a sentence is synonymous with the fact, whereas the 
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advocates of correspondence theory hold that facts are synonymous to meaning. Alston (1997: 34) writes that, 
“The meaning of ‘The proposition that lemons are sour is true’ cannot be the same as that of ‘Lemons are sour’. 
The former has conceptual content which is absent from the latter. One could understand ‘lemons are sour’ 
perfectly well without any concept of truth whatever.” Though, he affirms that minimalism is a matter of degree, 
yet he thinks that his position that ‘The proposition that is true that p if p” fits well into the minimalist 
framework.  
 
On the question: what it is for a truth-value bearer to be true? Alston stresses that his realist conception of truth 
defends a different thesis when compared with epistemic theories. The author maintains that his idea of truth 
(and proposition) goes to examine features that are captured in the concept as well as outside the concept used in 
expressing a given statement. This, he thinks, is not the case in epistemic theories. So, he reformulates his 
minimalist account of truth thus: “The proposition is that p is true if it is a fact that p” (Alston, 1997: 38) and 
thus argues then that it is only by the virtue of the same content can a proposition and fact be related (Alston, 
1997: 39). Nonetheless, he grants that correspondence theory is minimalist in this respect since truth and 
correspondence are tightly connected, though he rejects the claim that fact is dependent on language. It seems 
aptly to think in this respect, Alston imagines that there are “…no reason to suppose that facts are not objectively 
real” (Alston, 1997: 41). He goes on to separate his minimalist realism from deflationary theories. He sees his 
position to be a minimalist account that is committed to arguing that truth has a property, whereas deflationary 
stance is a contra-position. The author (1997: 42) rejects the position of deflationists because “…deflationists 
typically employ the T-schema to argue that since ‘The proposition that p is true’ is equivalent to ‘p’, in saying 
the former one is asserting only that p. Hence it is a mistake to suppose that the former involves the predication 
of a property of truth to a proposition or to anything else.” He notes that this critique against his position is called 
the redundancy theory and it is suggested quite clearly by F.P. Ramsey’s counter-position which opines that, “‘It 
is true that Caesar was murdered’ means no more than that Caesar was murdered” (Alston, 1997: 42). Other 
criticisms against Alston’s position are considered by him, especially Strawson’s stance that the statement ‘it is 
true that p” (the T-schema) does not serve a sentence-making role or does not make any statement on its own 
right or that it is not applied to anything. Alston, to be sure, provides good reasons how such criticism can be 
nullified. First, Alston argues that when one affirms a statement as true one does so by attributing the notion of 
truth to a thing—what is asserted. Secondly, he argues that a belief counts as knowledge only if it is true. Thirdly, 
he argues that utterances do have concessive force.  
 
The book’s greatest values are its trans-disciplinary nature and concern for practical implantation of truth in 
epistemological and other intellectual parlance, as well as in every aspect of life. Without a paradigm shift in 20
th
 
century epistemological posture, we stand to lose far more benefits of knowledge’s ingredients than 
epistemologists would imagine. For Alston’s epistemological guidebook to help prevent such losses, its adoption 
of proposition as bearer of truth is unquestionable. However, we doubt that there could be a monolithic way of 
deciding what the property of truth is if we do not grasp a language correctly. This makes the emphasis on 
language by the verificationist crucial to identifying the property of truth. While we consider Alston’s position 
more tenable when compared to several 20
th
 century perspectives on truth, we should not over-exaggerate its 
logical import. A further reading and a contentious engagement with the full chapters of the book will show 
whether Alston succeeds or not in his epistemological project. 
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